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Do the “bad guys” work together? It is often suggested that authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia will
work in league with other democracies, but analysis from Philipp Kuntz and Daniel Odinius suggests that, just like
some of the world’s leading democracies, authoritarian regimes will be extremely pragmatic in choosing their
geopolitical partners. 
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Do authoritarian countries cooperate to counter the worldwide spread of democracy? A growing number of
observers have raised this concern. Authoritarian powers such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia are the prime
suspects, said to be deliberately fostering non-democratic governance in their near abroad or even at global level.
That said, an agenda of autocracy promotion (or democracy prevention) is difficult to detect. Authoritarian regimes
do not necessarily prefer cooperation with other authoritarian governments over cooperation with democratic ones.
Pragmatism rather than authoritarian solidarity seems to guide their foreign policies. If it serves their interests, they
will even allow the subversion of fellow-autocrats.
Where authoritarian regimes support each other, motives other than solidarity might drive their behaviour. Russia’s
interventions in Ukraine since 2014 are a case in point. According to one interpretation, Putin was worried that the
overthrow of the Yanukovych regime created a dangerous precedent. His actions were aimed to undermine the
establishment of a functioning democracy in Ukraine. Others, however, see the Kremlin as guided primarily by
geopolitical considerations. Defending Russia’s sphere of interests led Putin to fuel conflict in Ukraine, not
democracy prevention. Yet, some accounts hold that that he grasped an opportunity to play the national card to
shore up his declining popularity.  
Our own research on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – made up by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – examines the conditions under which certain motives play a role. The way
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the organisation reacted to the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring suggests that rulers can indeed have a
fundamental interest in defending other authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes show solidarity where an
overthrow of regimes appears to threaten the own hold on power. Where the danger of spill-over is missing, other
foreign policy interests can even lead to the support of anti-regime movements. 
In early 2011, GCC leaders felt threatened by regime change in similar environments. Similarity was perceived in
two ways. First, uprisings against Arab monarchies were considered particularly dangerous. Second, uprisings
seemed risky when driven by social groups that also existed at home. In contrast, uprisings in dissimilar
environments gave the GCC regimes room to manoeuvre as less was at stake. Other motives, such as regional
influence, gained importance. 
Differences in threat perception explain different reactions by the GCC as a whole during the Arab Spring. The GCC
backed a number of similar regimes. Less affluent monarchies received financial support and the GCC helped the
Bahraini crackdown on protesters by sending security forces. Two non-member states – Jordan and Morocco –
were invited to join the club. The paramount objective was to prevent other monarchies from falling as this might
have sent an extremely dangerous signal. 
In republics, however, the GCC even undermines embattled Arab rulers. It facilitated the departure of the Yemeni
president, lent diplomatic and military support to the intervention in Libya and turned against the Syrian regime.
There was much less of a contagion to fear from uprisings in non-monarchies and Gulf States capitalized on
protests. By supporting favourable opposition groups, they could advance their regional influence. Denouncing
mass violence in other countries also gave them an opportunity to win domestic and international approval.
Responses to the uprisings also varied among GCC states as a consequence of differences in threat perception.
Saudi Arabia displayed more authoritarian solidarity than others. Riyadh’s heightened fear was again rooted in
assumptions about similarity. More than other GCC states it feared a spill-over of protests between similar social
groups from one state to another. The Saudi royal family was especially alarmed by protests in neighbouring
Bahrain as it feared they might inspire its own Shiite minority.
The example of the GCC confirms the impression that a general trend of authoritarian cooperation does not exist.
Just as democracies can back authoritarian regimes, authoritarian regimes may be entirely opportunistic in their
external relations. However, there are conditions under which authoritarian solidarity becomes a matter of crucial
importance: if situations are considered similar enough to fear a spread of rebellion across borders.
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